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Nicholas Alexander and Anne Marie Doherty 
 
The Origins of American International Retailing: 
Tiffany of New York in London and Paris, 1837-1914 
 
This article considers the international retailing activities of Tiffany of New York 
between 1837 and 1914. Using data from the company archive alongside other 
VRXUFHVWKHDUWLFOHFRQVLGHUVWKHILUP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHWDLORSHUDWLRQIURPHQWU\VWDJH
merchant buying activity through to the establishment of modern retailing facilities.  
The findings indicate five factors were determinants of sustainable international 
retailing: a centralized organizational structure, a stable ownership structure, existing 
international engagement, a strong brand identity, and a relevant international retail 
format. 3ODFLQJ7LIIDQ\¶VDFWLYLWLHVLQLWVZLGHUFRPPHUFLDOand consumer context, the 
findings illustrate the organizational changes and asset combination required to 
support the development of early international retail operations. The article 
contributes to theoretical understanding of the dynamics of retail internationalization. 
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The business history literature generally considers sustained international retailing activity to 
be a feature of the globalization of markets at the end of the twentieth century.1 Management 
literature encourages this perception; although, the chain store firm of Woolworth, which 
entered Canada in 1897, the UK in 1909 and Germany in 1926, is acknowledged as the 
notable exception that proves a general rule.2 The accepted narrative for the 
internationalization of American retailing on a large scale is one of a gradual increase in 
international retailing activity associated with food retailers and specialist retail firms from 
the 1960s onwards.3  
However, this interpretation does not stand up to close scrutiny. American manufacturing 
firms were involved in retailing outside the United States from the late nineteenth century, 
while American retail firms established international buying networks from the mid 
nineteenth century onwards. Singer, the sewing machine manufacturer, developed an 
extensive network of agents and retail outlets in foreign markets in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century.4 Kodak, the photographic materials manufacturer, began opening a chain 
of European stores in the 1890s. By 1900, its advertising in Europe claimed the firm had 
stores in London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Paris, Berlin, Brussels, Vienna, St Petersburg and 
Moscow.5 From a buying perspective, large American department store firms such as A.T. 
Stewart, Marshall Field and Wanamaker imported impressive volumes of goods.6 In 1872, a 
congressional investigating committee heard that A.T. Stewart was responsible for 10% of 
the imports coming through the port of New York.7 %\³0DUVKDOO)LHOGDQG&RPSDQ\
was paying three-fifths of all customs duties at the Port of Chicago and was the largest 
LPSRUWHULQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´8 The scale of their buying encouraged these firms to establish 
European buying offices.9 This international sourcing was fundamental to how they marketed 
themselves to domestic consumers. However, American department stores did not 
internationalize in this period.  
Given the contribution American chain store retailers such as Woolworth made to the 
internationalization of retailing in the twentieth century, consideration of nineteenth century 
international retail activity provides an opportunity to explore those firm level factors that 
precipitated the internationalization process. That is, how early international retailing activity 
grew out of the merchant activities of firmVVXFKDV7LIIDQ\RI1HZ<RUN7LIIDQ\¶VWUDQVLWLRQ
from international merchant to international retailer provides a unique opportunity to 
investigate those factors that stimulated and supported early retail internationalization. By 
considering the development of this example of an international retailer over an extended 
period, it is possible to advance our theoretical understanding of the retail internationalization 
process. The research reported here addresses the following question: what firm level factors 
were required to initiate and sustain international retail operations in the late nineteenth 
century?   
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Literature Review 
 
The internationalization of retailing emerged as a distinct research theme in the management 
literature at the end of the twentieth century.10 This literature defines the internationalization 
of retailing as the transfer of retail technology and concepts, and international retailing as the 
operation of retail outlets in the domestic market and at least one foreign market. In this 
literature, international retailing is a forward facing consumer-oriented activity.11 It contains 
three implicit assumptions about international retail firms. First, they are primarily engaged in 
the retail trade in their domestic and foreign markets. Second, they are large or very large 
corporations that are shareholder owned. Third, buying activity is not a distinguishing 
characteristic. These assumptions reflect international retailing activity in the later decades of 
the twentieth century and early decades of the twenty-first century. However, they are not 
entirely compatible with earlier examples of international retailing.12  
First, there is a long history of manufacturing firms with international retail operations. For 
example, Singer developed an extensive international distribution system by 1914 that was 
IXQGDPHQWDO WR WKH ILUP¶V VXFFHVV13 It established an integrated network of international 
offices where wholesaling and retailing developed side by side. The firm¶VV\VWHPRI offices 
and sub-offices protected the brand through sales and service support. Second, international 
retailing is not entirely the preserve of large publically quoted companies. Research on 
British retail internationalization has suggested smaller firms might prove a suitable subject 
for further historical research.14 Initial research confirms smaller firms do undertake 
international initiatives.15 Third, the assumption in the management literature that 
international buying neither defines international retailing nor is it a determinant of 
international retailing operations is not challenged by the business history literature. In part, 
this may be a consequence of business historians viewing international retailing as a support 
function for manufacturing operations.16 That is, the manufacturing firm establishes 
international retail outlets to enhance and control the distribution, selling and servicing of in-
house products. Such a firm does not market products derived from buying operations. From 
a retail management perspective, lack of evidence to support the role of buying activity as a 
determinant of international retailing may be a consequence of the organizational structure of 
large retail enterprises.17  That is, the separation of functions may preclude the transfer of 
international experience across a business.18  
In the management literature, the causes of international retailing are a mixture of exogenous 
and endogenous factors.19 Exogenous push factors are associated with domestic market 
saturation and exogenous pull factors are associated with opportunities in host markets. The 
endogenous factors that motivate firms to internationalize are the strength of the retail brand 
and distinctiveness of operating format.20 Depending on the mix of factors that cause 
international activity, retailers are categorized as reactive or proactive firms.21 Limited 
opportunities in the home market push reactive firms toward internationalization. 
Opportunities in the host market pull proactive retailers into international markets. The 
process of retail internationalization is explained with reference to (i) drivers of change 
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ZLWKLQWKHILUPLLWKHILUP¶VLQWHUQDOIDFLOLWDWLQJFRPSHWHQFLHVDQGLLLWKHILUP¶VDELOLW\WR
assert control over firm assets within the changing dynamic of the external market 
environment.22 Asset-based and transaction-EDVHGGULYHUVRIFKDQJHFRUUHVSRQGWR'XQQLQJ¶V
ownership advantages.23 Asset-based advantages derive from the intangible asset of the brand 
in which the retailer has proprietary rights along with the operating systems and formats used 
by the firm. The assets are exclusively in the possession of a firm. Asset-based advantages 
are the result of innovation within the retail firm and are context dependent; that is, they are 
dependent on characteristics of consumption within the home market. Firms develop these 
assets in the domestic market and exploit them in foreign markets. In contrast, firms derive 
transaction-based advantages from the experience of operating international outlets.24 Internal 
facilitating competencies are the means by which the retail firm is able to transfer asset-based 
ownership advantages and capture transaction-based ownership advantages. Leadership, 
functional coordination, management experience, and the perceptions and attitudes within an 
RUJDQL]DWLRQGHWHUPLQH WKH ILUP¶V DELOLW\ WRGHYHORS LQWHUQDWLRQDORSHUDWLRQV25 In the early 
stages of international activity, a firm will be able to make semi-informed judgements 
regarding the best way to exploit asset-based advantages. Transaction-based ownership 
advantages will inform subsequent exploitation of international market opportunities.  
This theoretical analysis accommodates twentieth century and early twenty-first century 
international retailing. However, the importance of manufacturers to the development of 
international retailing before the second half of the twentieth century has led some business 
historians to suggest that firms engaged in early international retailing did not possess retail 
specific asset-EDVHGRZQHUVKLSDGYDQWDJHVWKDWLVILUPVGLGQRWKDYH³DVWURQJUHWDLOEUDQGRU
V\VWHP´26 In order to address this question, and determine what firm level factors were 
required to initiate and sustain international retail operations in the late nineteenth century, it 
is necessary to consider the retail context in which firms such as Tiffany operated.   
 
Retail Context 
 
2WKHU$PHULFDQILUPVSURYLGHDQLQVWUXFWLYHEHQFKPDUNIRU7LIIDQ\¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHWDLOLQJ
activities before 1914. In order to provide context and comparisons, we consider the 
development of the department store, the chain store and the manufacturer with retail 
networks. Department stores, such as A.T. Stewart of New York, provide early examples of 
innovative retail development. The chain store, Woolworth, provides an example of a retail 
firm that developed international operations at an early date. The manufacturer, Singer, with 
international retail networks, provides an example of a firm where the primary commercial 
interest was not retailing. Department stores provide a valuable comparison for the whole of 
this period. Chain store development is useful as a comparison for the end of the period. 
Unlike the department stores that began to develop in the middle decades of the nineteenth 
century, chain stores were a product of the 1890s onward. By the first decade of the twentieth 
century, department stores had a multi-department structure and occupied large iconic stores. 
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In contrast, store chains comprised single unit operations replicated across a market. 
Operationally department stores combined the role of buyer and retail manager. Chain stores 
VHSDUDWHG WKHVH IXQFWLRQV WKHUHE\ IDFLOLWDWLQJ WKH VLPSOLILFDWLRQRI WKH VWRUH PDQDJHU¶V UROH
and the replication of units within the chain.  
Innovation in retailing in the late nineteenth century is associated with large business 
organizations. The growth of the department store in Britain, France and the United States 
has generated a wealth of published material.27 In this way, DQG ZLWK WKH KHOS RI =ROD¶V
literary representation of the French department store at its most dynamic, the department 
VWRUH KDV FRPH WR UHSUHVHQW UHWDLOLQJ¶V UHVSRQVH WR FKDQJLQJ HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLDO
conditions.28 Chandler places considerable emphasis on retailing when discussing the 
emergence of managerial capitalism. He asserts tKH ILUVW ³PDQDJHULDO KLHUDUFKLHV DSSHDUHG
during the 1850s and 1860s to coordinate the movements of trains and flow of goods over the 
QHZ UDLOURDG QHWZRUNV « WKHQ TXLFNO\ FDPH LQWo use to manage the new mass retailing 
establishments - WKHGHSDUWPHQW VWRUHVPDLO RUGHUKRXVHV DQGFKDLQVRUPXOWLSOH VKRSV´29 
&KDQGOHU¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ SODFHV SULPDU\ HPSKDVLV RQ RUJDQL]DWLRQDO VWUXFWXUH +H LV
interested in the scale of the organization and the scope of organizational activities. However, 
the department stores on which Chandler placed so much emphasis remained domestic 
operations. In this section, we consider key business characteristics that may have inhibited 
the internationalization of large retail firms in the late nineteenth century.      
Partnerships characterized retail ownership arrangements in the nineteenth century. They 
were fluid and potentially unstable. A successful partnership could be terminated after an 
agreed period, usually three years. Partnerships were often based around familial-social 
relationships and were renegotiated at regular intervals.30 Even where the same partners 
remained in place for some time, agreements were subject to periodic alterations in partner 
participation and financial investment. American department stores were no exception.31 The 
demise of A.T. Stewart as an independent department store business illustrates the inherent 
instability of partnership arrangements and associated succession problems.32 The history of 
large American department store firms is punctuated by the arrival and departure of partners. 
The tensions inhereQWLQDQ\SDUWQHUVKLSDUUDQJHPHQWDUHLOOXVWUDWHGE\6HOIULGJH¶VIUXVWUDWLRQ
with his position at Marshall Field.33 However, despite the limitations of this ownership 
structure, American department stores delayed incorporation. Marshall Field & Company did 
not incorporate until 1901 and R.H. Macy & Co did not incorporate until 1919.34 In the chain 
store sector, Woolworth was a syndicate of partner organizations. However, in 1905 
IROORZLQJKHDOWKSUREOHPVDQG³FRQFHUQDVWRZKDWZRXOGKDSSHQWRKLVEXVLQHVVDnd to the 
PHQ DQG ZRPHQ RI KLV V\QGLFDWH ZHUH KH « WR GHFHDVH´ )UDQN :RROZRUWK GHFLGHG WR
WUDQVIRUP ³WKH VWUXFWXUH RI KLV V\QGLFDWH IURP DQ XQLQFRUSRUDWHG FRPSDQ\´35 In a general 
letter to his employees in February 1905, Woolworth noted, because of incorSRUDWLRQ ³Qo 
matter what happens to me as President, or to any of the other officers of the company, the 
EXVLQHVVJRHVRQMXVWWKHVDPH´36  
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,QDUHWDLOLQJFRQWH[W:LONLQV¶DQDO\VLVRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRILQWDQJLEOHDVVHWVWRLQWHUQDWLRQDO
WUDGHRI³EUDQG QDPHVWUDGHQDPHVDQGFRPSDQ\QDPHV´SURYLGHVDXVHIXOFRXQWHU-point to 
the emphasis on organizational structure provided by Chandler.37 Whether it is international 
retailing associated with large manufacturing operations such as Singer or large chain store 
operations such as Woolworth, brand name, fascia name and/or company name were 
important assets. They were important in the domestic market but especially important for the 
transference of innovation to international markets. In international markets, Singer generated 
increased sales through a distribution system designed to support and protect the brand.38 In 
contrast, department stores did not achieve a clear brand identity across their domestic 
operation. Certainly, they developed strong company names and the large fixed iconic store 
ZDVDQLPSRUWDQWPDUNHWLQJWRRO)RUH[DPSOH0DF\¶VVWRUHLQ1HZ<RUNZDVWKHSK\VLFDO
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V PDUNHWLQJ PHVVDJH D WDQJLEOH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI FRQVXPHU
aspiration. However, this asset was neither fully leveraged nor fully appreciated within the 
firm. ,Q WKH ODWH V IROORZLQJ WKH GHDWK RI WKH ILUP¶V IRXQGHU 5RZODQG 0DF\ WKH
UHPDLQLQJSDUWQHUVDQWLFLSDWHGFKDQJLQJWKHILUP¶VQDPHWR/D)RUJH	9DOHQWLQHIURPWKH
beginning of January 1879. Only the sudden death of La Forge prevented this.39 In the late 
nineteenth century, department store firms did not develop a single powerful product based 
brand identity.40 $V /DQFDVWHU QRWHV ³GHVSLWH WKH ULVH RI UHJLVWHUHG WUDGHPDUNV WKH
[department] stores themselves created the ethos of the goods sold. The department store with 
LWVGLVSOD\VVHUYLFHVDQGPRVWLPSRUWDQWWUDGLWLRQIXQFWLRQHGDVWKHEUDQG´41 
For large nineteenth century American retailers, international markets were less a retail 
opportunity and more a sourcing opportunity. From a very early date in their development, 
American department stores relied heavily on the marketing benefits derived from buying 
European products.42 Alexander Stewart opened a buying office in Paris in 1845.43 In 1871, 
Marshall Field opened a buying office in Manchester, England, and a Paris office followed in 
1872.44 International sourcing met the needs of an emerging mass market for which country 
of origin provided an important indicator of quality and sophistication. The department stores 
RQERWKVLGHVRIWKH$WODQWLFUHVSRQGHGWRWKLVQHHG$V0LOOHUQRWHVZLWKUHIHUHQFHWR=ROD¶V
OLWHUDU\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIGHSDUWPHQWVWRUHVDQGWKHLULPSDFWRQWKHHFRQRP\DQGVRFLHW\³,Q
=ROD¶VYLVLRQWKHUHZDVDQDZDUHQHVVWKDWDZD\RIlife was passing, that with the department 
store was emerging a society more impersonal, more uniform, more machine-like, more 
mass-OLNH´45 In this, there is a paradox: large American retail businesses were drawn to 
European markets because they offered sophistication by association for the growing market 
back home; however, the markets to which they travelled to source goods did not attract 
international investment until the twentieth century.   
The chain store depended on the same factors that drove the development of the department 
VWRUH KLJKHU ³OHYHOV RI FDSLWDOL]DWLRQ WKH YROXPH DQG W\SH RI JRRGV GLVSOD\HG DQG WKH
FXVWRPHUEDVH´46 However, there was a fundamental difference between the department store 
and the chain store. By separating the role of retail store manager from retail buyer the chain 
store firm had an asset, in a replicable retail format, that the department store firm lacked.47 
The chain store operation was exclusively customer facing. It could be transferred 
domestically from one town to another and ultimately from one national market to another. 
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:RROZRUWK KDG ³ VWRUHV LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´ when it entered the British market in 
1909.48  1HYHUWKHOHVV DV &KDQGOHU QRWHV FKDLQ VWRUHV ³GLG QRW EHFRPH D VLJQLILFDQW UHWDLO
institution until WKHILUVWGHFDGHRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\´49 Consequently, for large American 
UHWDLOEXVLQHVVHVWKDWFRQIRUPWR&KDQGOHU¶VLGHDORIPDQDJHULDOFDSLWDOLVPH[SUHVVHGWKURXJK
scale and scope, internationalization did not occur until the years immediately before the 
outbreak of war in Europe in 1914.  
Managerial capitalism and the achievement of scale and scope certainly drove major changes 
in fixed retailing, mail order and wholesaling in the United States market during the late 
nineteenth century. However, it did not lead to the internationalization of those businesses 
that epitomized this system. In order to understand the factors that drove retail 
internationalization, this paper moves the emphasis away from large retail formats to the 
specialist retailer and the role of the specialist retailer in the development of international 
retail activity during the second half of the nineteenth century. In this, the firm considered 
here is a precursor to the American chain stores that internationalized in the twentieth 
century. In addition, it provides a comparison with department stores that failed to 
internationalize in the nineteenth century. This paper is concerned with an international 
specialist retailer that sustained operations in two foreign markets: Britain and France.50 
Tiffany of New York began operations in Europe in 1850. When Woolworth opened its first 
store in Britain in 1909, Tiffany already had six decades of international business experience 
behind it.  
 
Tiffany of New York 
 
The sources available to the researcher interested in nineteenth century history of 
international retailers are limited. However, Tiffany of New York is a retailer that provides 
firm level data to support such a study. The firm has been in continuous existence since 1837. 
This has facilitated the survival of some nineteenth century internal business records. Where 
firms have passed through disruptive ownership arrangements or have ceased trading, 
valuable documentation is often lost. Tiffany & Co. maintains a professionally managed 
archive at its offices and operating facilities at Parsippany, New Jersey. The archive primarily 
serves the commercial requirements of the firm. Consequently, access is restricted. Gaining 
access was an important stage in the research process. Internal business documents available 
at the archive provide an opportunity to consider firm structure and strategic decision-making 
processes.51 In addition, we use documentation external to the firm: trade directories, tax 
records and newspaper advertisements. These documents provide valuable data sources. Used 
in conjunction with internal archival documents they provide data that firmly date and place 
events in a way that later commentary or internal business documents may not. Used in 
combination, these documents provide considerable operational, strategic and marketing 
insights. Methodologically, using a range of internal and external sources demonstrates how 
research into early international retail firm activity can be achieved.  
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We discuss our findings thematically. That is, we consider those factors that enabled Tiffany 
to establish and sustain international retail operations during the nineteenth century. Analysis 
indicates the following themes: a centralized organizational structure, a stable ownership 
structure, existing international engagement, a strong brand identity, and a relevant 
international retail format in the context of an expanding consumer market. From our data 
collection, the following narrative emerged. The first Tiffany retail store opened in 1837 at 
259 Broadway, New York. From inception, the store emphasized its international sourcing 
activities. Partners made buying trips to Europe, particularly Paris, in the 1840s. In 1850, the 
success of these buying visits led directly to the establishment of a buying office in Paris; at 
79 rue de Richelieu. This office was under the management of a new partner, Gideon Reed. 
By 1868, when the firm incorporated, the original buying office had outlived its usefulness 
and new premises were found at 57 rue du Cardinal Fesch.52 Here a greater emphasis was 
plDFHGRQUHWDLOLQJDFWLYLW\ ,QIROORZLQJWKHILUP¶VVXFFHVVDW WKH3DULV([KLELWLRQRI
that year, Tiffany transferred its operation to a more central and fashionable location at 36bis 
$YHQXH GH O¶2SHUD 7KLV ORFDWLRQ ZDV VXSHUVHGHG E\ PXFK ODUJHU SUHmises at 3 Place de 
O¶2SHUD LQ  0HDQZKLOH D EX\LQJ RIILFH ZDV RSHQHG LQ /RQGRQ LQ  DW  $UJ\OO
Street. Increased business led to the transfer to a new office at 5 Argyll Place in 1883. A 
dedicated retail store opened in 1891 at 221/221A Regent Street. This chronology is included 
in table 2 later in the article. The factors that contributed to this process and enabled Tiffany 
to succeed as a pioneering international retailer are discussed thematically below.  
7KH ILUP¶V RUJDQL]DWLRQDO VWUXFWXUH was fundamental to its emergence as an early 
international retail operation. Tiffany maintained a centralized organizational structure 
throughout the period under consideration. This was due to two factors. First, the leadership 
structure and entrepreneurial nature of that leadership ensured tight control. One of the 
original founders of the business, Charles L. Tiffany, was involved in the running of the 
business until his death in 1902.53 The business did not suffer from extended communication 
channels. The partnership structure provided direct communication between the New York 
and Paris operations. After incorporation, the board in New York continued to maintain a 
close relationship with the European operation. Second, the scale of the business was small 
and scope was narrow. This was neither a business that required elaborate divisional 
structures nor a business that extended over a wide range of product categories. Certainly, the 
first catalogue issued by the firm in 1845 shows an eclectic range of goods; however, in the 
context of the time, these were fancy goods and the firm specialized in them.54 As the 
business developed there was an increasing emphasis on precious stones, silverware, jewelry 
and watches.55 The firm primarily focused on items of high individual value. 
  
Table 1 
 
7KH ILUP¶V RZQHUVKLS VWUXFWXUH VXSSRUWHG LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ DV LW GHYHORSHG ZLWK WKH
changing needs of the business. Charles Tiffany and John B. Young, who had been friends 
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since their youth, formed the first partnership in 1837.56 A $1,000 loan from Charles 
7LIIDQ\¶VIDWKHUSURYLGHGWKHFDSLWDOUHTXLUHGWRHVWDEOLVKWKHUHWDLOEXVLQHVV57 Their social-
IDPLOLDO FRQQHFWLRQV VWUHQJWKHQHG LQ  ZKHQ &KDUOHV 7LIIDQ\ PDUULHG <RXQJ¶V VLVWHU58 
However, as the enterprise developed a series of partners joined and left the firm as business 
QHHGVFKDQJHG7DEOHLOOXVWUDWHVWKHWHPSRUDU\DQGVKLIWLQJQDWXUHRIWKHILUP¶VSDUWQHUVKLS
agreements between the founding of the original business in 1837 and incorporation of the 
firm in 1868. During this time, the firm had ten partners. Only one, Charles Tiffany, was a 
partner for the full period of thirty-one years. Following the renegotiation of agreements, 
partners fulfilled distinct functions. Ellis joined the partnership in 1841 to facilitate John B. 
Young travelling to Europe to source merchandise for the business.59 In 1850, Gideon Reed 
joined the partnership to act as the resident partner in Europe to oversee the development of 
the international operation.60 This international partnership structure was fundamental to the 
first phase of European development. A resident American partner in Paris bridged the gap 
that might otherwise have existed between the firm in New York and its European operation. 
5HHG¶VH[SHFWDWLRQVZHUHFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKRVH of the remaining partners in New York. He 
was able to respond to European conditions and support the retailing of goods to expatriate 
Americans. As a resident partner in Paris, Reed reduced psychic distance for co-partners and 
customers alike.61   
Because these partnerships were, by definition, not limited liability arrangements, as the 
number of partners increased the later agreements attempted to reduce the freedom of action 
of the junior partners. By the last ten years of the partnership structure, a managerial class 
HPHUJHGZLWK MXQLRUSDUWQHUV¶ UHPXQHUDWLRQEHFRPLQJVDODULHG LQ IRUP%\ WKH ODWHV
the firm had grown beyond a partnership structure. On the one hand, the firm needed to bind 
able managers into the business and on the other it needed to be able to control the liability 
partnership agreements brought with them. Incorporation provided a framework within which 
more ambitious international operations could be considered. This was particularly important 
in a context where the resident partner in Paris had been in place for nearly two decades and 
the arrangement could not be maintained indefinitely. Continuation of the partnership 
structure would require an equally able, trustworthy and committed replacement in the event 
RI5HHG¶VUHWLUHPHQW 
7KHILUP¶VUHVLGHQWLQWHUQDWLRQDORIILFHZDVLQVWUXPHQWDOLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
retail activity. From 1850 to 1868 the office in Paris was located at 79 rue de Richelieu.62 
+H\GW LQKLVEULHIKLVWRU\RI WKHILUPUHIHUV WR LWDV³WKHILUVWEUDQFKKRXVH´DQG LPSOLHV LWV
function was that of buying office.63 ,QWKHVWKHILUP¶VOLVWLQJLQ3DULVWUDGHGLUHFWRULHV
FRQILUPV WKH UROH RI ³FRPPLVVLRQDLUHV´ RU PHUFKDQWV64 However, it is also clear that the 
office began to develop a retail function at an early stage. For example, 1863 advertising 
PDWHULDOSXEOLVKHGDVWKH³&RXUULHUGHVK{WHOVHW*XLGHGXFRPPHUFHUpXQLV´OLVWV³7LIIDQ\
5HHG HW FRPS  U 5LFKHOLHX RQW GHV GHPDQGHV G¶$PpULTXH HQ GLYHUV DUW 'H KDXWH
QRXYHDXWp 9RQW HQ PDJDVLQ´65 Aimed at visitors to Paris, this and other advertisements 
indicate that the rue de Richelieu facility was functioning as a rudimentary retail operation by 
the 1860s. Consequently, at the first board meeting of the newly incorporated firm, held on 
Monday 8 -XQH  ³LW ZDV GHHPHG DGYLVDEOH WR VHFXUH DQRWKHU DQG PRUH GHVLUDEOH
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ORFDWLRQDVZHOODVFRQYHQLHQFHVIRUDGYDQFLQJWKHEHVWLQWHUHVWVRIWKH&RPSDQ\´LQ3DULV66 
,PSRUWDQWO\ ³LWZDV DOVRSURSRVHG WRKDYHFRQVWDQWO\RQKDQGD VXLWDEOHGLVSOD\RI JRRds, 
adequate to meet the demands of our many friends and customers who may see fit at any time 
WR FDOO XSRQ WKH3DULV+RXVH´67 7KHQHZSUHPLVHVRI ³7LIIDQ\5HHG 	 &R3DULV UXHGX
&DUGLQDO )HVFK ´ ZHUH RSHQ IRU EXVLQHVV E\ &KULVWPDV RI 68 In GambRQ¶V WUDGH
GLUHFWRU\ IRU3DULV LQ WKH ILUPDSSHDUV LQ D OLVW RIPHUFKDQWEX\LQJRIILFHV ³7LIIDQ\
Reed et Cie, bronzes et bijouterie pour leui maison de New-<RUN´69 At the rue du Cardinal 
Fesch the business was still in transition from merchant to retail operation. 
This transition from buying office to retail outlet also occurred in London. The firm was 
sourcing merchandise from London by the early 1870s. For example, Tiffany was agent in 
the United States for the British watch business of Frodsham.70 However, unstable conditions 
in Paris following the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war triggered the opening of a London 
office. Gideon Reed escaped from Paris to London in October 1870 and initially operated 
from hotel accommodation before an office descULEHGDV7LIIDQ\5HHG	&R³PHUFKDQWV´
opened at 29 Argyll Street in late 1871.71 The firm transferred to larger office 
accommodation at 5 Argyll Place in 1883.72 However, it was not until 1891 that the firm 
moved the short distance to 221 and 221A Regent Street in order to operate a dedicated retail 
outlet.73  
With the move to Regent Street, buying became a secondary function. A London trade 
magazine article of the time observes this transition. The article, noting the recent opening of 
7LIIDQ\¶VQHZ5HJHQW Street store, emphasizes the impact this would have on nearby jewelers 
ZKRKDGEHQHILWWHG IURP$PHULFDQYLVLWRUV WR/RQGRQ7KHDUWLFOHREVHUYHV³D UHWDLO WUDGH
ZLOO EH FDUULHG RQ´ DW WKH QHZ DGGUHVV ZKHUHDV EHIRUH ³SUDFWLFDOO\ QR UHWDLO EXVLQHVV ZDV
donH´DWWKHHDUOLHUDGGUHVV74 7KHWUDGHMRXUQDOFRQWLQXHG³$PHULFDQVYLVLWLQJWKLVFRXQWU\
RIWHQ LQTXLUHGDIWHU7LIIDQ\¶VVWRUH´ WKH ORFDWLRQRI WKH$UJ\OO3ODFHRIILFHPHDQW³QRRQH
FRXOG GLUHFW WKHP WR LW´75 Employment records confirm that retailing activity had been a 
business function at the Argyll Place address.76 That is, the firm having established an office 
in London would serve loyal and favored customers despite retailing not being its main or 
initially intended function. Consumer demand existed in London, just as it had done in Paris, 
before dedicated retail facilities were available.  
This has two important implications for understanding the development of international retail 
activity at this time. First, retail activity occurred because the firm had a resident international 
buying office. An office provided an opportunity for the firm to learn, in-market, what 
customers required of an international retail branch store. Second, a move from one location 
to another does not necessarily indicate a change in function; rather it indicates the formal 
recognition within the firm of a changing balance of functions. Therefore, while it may be 
tempting to see the move to new premises at rue du Cardinal Fesch in Paris (1868) or Regent 
Street in London (1891) as a definitive demarcation between buying office and retail store, 
such an interpretation would ignore the subtleties of the development process. Retailing 
activity preceded these moves and buying activity continued after them. 
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7KH ILUP¶V GHYHORSPHQW RI a strong brand was crucial to the retail internationalization 
process. Since its inception, Tiffany had emphasized the quality of its goods through its 
international sourcing activities. The first catalogue of 1845 explained that merchandise was 
³RIWKHLUown importation ± made to order, or selected from the best sources, by one of their 
ILUPUHVLGHQWLQ(XURSH´77 As the business developed, a greater emphasis was placed on the 
branding, rather than simply the selling, of merchandise. In the early 1870s, in order to ensure 
merchandise of the highest quality, the firm manufactured watches in Geneva, Switzerland. 
,Q  WKH ERDUG GHFLGHG ³WKDW DOO ZDWFKHV PDGH E\ XV EH RQO\ PDUNHG 7LIIDQ\ DQG
&RPSDQ\*HQHYD WKXVDGRSWLQJWKH+RXVHQDPHDVDWUDGHPDUN´78 Incorporation in 1868 
was both an important step in the reorganization of the firm and in establishing a consistent 
identity. However, the European operation continued to trade as Tiffany, Reed & Co. until 
5HHG¶V retirement in April 1875. Informed of his intended departure, the board had initially 
³GHWHUPLQHG WRFRQWLQXH WKHEXVLQHVV LQ3DULVDQG/RQGRQXQGHU WKHQDPHRI7LIIDQ\5HHG
DQG &RPSDQ\ DQG 0U 3, GH +RUUDFN DQG 0U &KDUOHV $ 5HHG´ ZHUH ³DSSRLQWHG MRLQW
DJHQWVWRWUDQVDFW´WKHILUP¶V³(XURSHDQEXVLQHVV´79 However, the firm ultimately decided to 
GURSµ5HHG¶IURPWKHQDPHRIWKHRSHUDWLRQLQ(XURSHDQGDGRSWWKHQDPHXVHGLQWKH8QLWHG
States: Tiffany & Co.80 This act established a consistent brand identity across all markets. 
7LIIDQ\¶V EUDQG SRVLWLRQLQJ ZDV HQKDQFHG IXUWKHU E\ HQGRUVHPHQWV 7KLV WRRN WZR IRUPV
royal wDUUDQWV DQG WKH SUL]HV UHFHLYHG DW :RUOG¶V )DLUV H[KLELWLRQV ,Q WKH HDUO\ V
Tiffany actively sought endorsements from European royal patrons,81 while their 
representation at exhibitions enhanced a reputation for quality that communicated the values 
of the brand to a wider audience.  The success of the brand and its increasing market visibility 
led directly to the decision to improve retail facilities in EuropH$VWKHILUP¶VFDWDORJXHRI
1879-80 notes:  
³6LQFHWKH([SRVLWLRQ8QLYHUVHOOHDW3DULVODVW\HDU>@ZKHUH0ESSRS. TIFFANY 
	 &R¶V JRRGV ZRQ WKH *UDQG 3UL]H WKHUH KDV EHHQ D FRQWLQXDO GHPDQG IRU WKHLU
wares in Europe, and to facilitate the growing foreign business they have removed 
their Paris house to the more central and accessible location ± $YHQXH GH O¶2SHUD
36bis, which is the only place besides the Union Square [New York] establishment 
where their goods can be purchased, as they are never sold WRGHDOHUV´82   
This statement is significant for two reasons: it illustrates the prominence achieved by the 
Tiffany brand and it emphasizes the close relationship between brand as product and brand as 
an in-house retail-service experience. 
7KH ILUP¶V DELOity to respond to changing market conditions with format development and 
innovation was fundamental to establishing a sustainable international retail operation. The 
HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI WKH /RQGRQ VWRUH LQ  DQG WKH 3DULV VWRUH LQ  LOOXVWUDWH WKH ILUP¶s 
response to changing market conditions and the recognition of the need for an international 
retail format. These two innovations are discussed below. 
The first Tiffany store in London provided access and assortment not previously available to 
customers. A London based trade journal, The Watchmaker, Jeweller and Silversmith, noted 
12 
 
LQ LWV  -XO\  HGLWLRQ ³WKH $PHULFDQ VWRUH LV QRZ ORFDWHG LQ 5HJHQW VWUHHW´83 Before 
moving into the new premises, Tiffany combined two shops and through its improvements 
increased the gross estimated rental value of the property by 70%.84 Heydt suggests that at the 
WLPHKHZDVZULWLQJ³WKH/RQGRQKRXVHRFFXSLHVDKDQGVRPHVWRUHDWDQG$
5HJHQW 6WUHHW ZKHUH D ODUJH DVVRUWPHQW RI 7LIIDQ\ 	 &R¶V SURGXFWV DUH DOZDys kept in 
VWRFN´85 The store carried a specialist merchandise range. Store window advertising 
describes a jeweler, selling precious stones.86 Sales to customers show the store had a 
particularly strong trade in jewelry items such as bracelets, brooches, necklaces, pendants, 
rings and tiaras, along with purses and watches.87 Advertising shows the firm specialized in 
jewelry, watches, silverware and objects of art.88 Photographs of the store, from 1898 and 
1910, depict a four-story building, with a street-level store frontage.89 The fascia emphasizes 
WKH ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO SURILOH 1HZ <RUN DQG 3DULV 2Q WKH FRUQHU RI 0DGGR[ 6WUHHW DQG
5HJHQW6WUHHW LW RFFXSLHGDSURPLQHQW ORFDWLRQRQRQHRI /RQGRQ¶VPRVWSUHVWLJLRXV UHWDLO
thoroughfares. It was opposite LiberW\¶VPDLQVWRUHZKLFKZDVWKHQRQ5HJHQW6WUHHW 
The headquarters of the European business remained in Paris. However, the Paris operation at 
WKH $YHQXH GH O¶2SHUD ZDV EHFRPLQJ LQDGHTXDWH IRU GHDOLQJ ZLWK LQFUHDVLQJ FRQVXPHU
demand. Relocation to the AveQXHGHO¶2SHUDLQSODFHGWKH3DULVRSHUDWLRQLQDPRUH
central and fashionable position. However, the new location did not have facilities at ground 
floor level directly accessible from the street.90 This became a major limitation of the 
business. The sales area was on the first upper story, providing a discrete selling space for 
loyal customers. It was in many respects appropriate for the sale of the high value items: 
diamonds, jewelry, watches and American silverware.91 +RZHYHU DV WKH ILUP¶V SRWHQWLDO
PDUNHW JUHZ WKH OLPLWHG UHWDLO VDOHV VSDFH DW WKH $YHQXH GH O¶2SHUD SURPSWHG WKH ILUP WR
obtain accommodation more accessible to passers-by.92 On 4 October 1905, the board sent a 
letter to Messrs Tiffany & Co. Paris indicating that: 
³'XULQJ KLV ODVW YLVLW WR 3DULV 0U /RXLV & 7LIIDQ\ ZDV PXFK LPSUHVVHG ZLWK WKH
advantages the local jewelers there possess in having their salesrooms on the ground 
or street level. Everyone visiting Paris devotes more or less time to looking at the 
wares displayed in the shop windows, and the convenience and ease with which one 
can step into a shop on the street level to examine and price goods undoubtedly lead 
to many sales which are - though being located on an upper floor - ORVW´93 
The firm had been keen to respond to market needs for some time, this was not the first time 
WKLV GHYHORSPHQW KDG EHHQ FRQVLGHUHG KRZHYHU ³D VXLWDEOH SODFH KDV QHYHU EHHQ
DYDLODEOH´94 The Paris house was a complex operation by the beginning of the decade, with 
29 members of staff in various roles.95 Initially Louis Comfort Tiffany suggested securing the 
shop on the ground floor of the building in which the firm already operated, 36bis Avenue de 
O¶2SHUD7KH3DULVEUDQFK cabled the board in New York on 20 November 1905 to inform 
them, WKH³7RXULVW VKRSFRQWURO OHDVHXQWLO -XO\ UHQWDO)UV- SHU\HDU´96 But it 
soon became evident to the board that merely expanding into the ground floor of the existing 
branch would be insufficient. By earO\WKHERDUG¶VSODQVIRUWKH3DULVVWRUHKDGEHFRPH
PRUHDPELWLRXV7KH(TXLWDEOH/LIH$VVXUDQFH6RFLHW\RI1HZ<RUN7LIIDQ\¶V ODQGORUG LQ
Paris, was to offer the firm a more prestigious site with a larger sales area close by: that is, 
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³WKHJURXQGIloor, entre-sol, first floor and basement of their building at rue de la Paix and 
$YHQXHGHO
2SHUD´97 The lease was to be for twenty-four years commencing 1 April 1907 at 
an annual rental of 200,000 francs.98 However, the rental cost was to increase further and 
substantially. Minutes of the board taken on 15 January 1907 indicate improvements by the 
Equitable would result in a more expensive lease, amounting to a higher rent of 325,000 
francs per year.99 The board was clearly prepared to countenance this higKHUFRVWJLYLQJ³0U
&00RRUHPDQDJHURI WKH3DULV+RXVH´QHJRWLDWLQJSRZHU³WRPDNHWKHEHVWDUUDQJHPHQW
SRVVLEOHIRUWKHFKDQJHVLQ&RQWHPSODWLRQ´100 The new store was an ambitious undertaking. 
This is reflected in contemporary accounts RI WKH VWRUH¶V Gevelopment.101 The Daily Trade 
Record New York details the length to which the architects and designers were willing to go 
to ensure the most effective store possible. TKHQHZVSDSHUQRWHV³EHIRUH work on the store 
itself was begun a full-size model in plaster, showing a section of the store as it now appears, 
ZDVVHWXSLQRQHRIWKHVXEXUEVRI3DULV´102  
7LIIDQ\¶VUHWDLORSHUDWLRQLQ3DULVFKDQJHGIURPEHLQJDQXSSHUVWRU\VDOHVURRPWRDQHZW\SH
of international store. The New York Herald, Paris edition, ran a long feature on it on Sunday 
$SULO³WKHQHZVKRSLVFRQVWUXFWHGRQOLQHVHQWLUHO\GLIIHUHQWIURPWKRVHHPSOR\HG
in the typical jewelry shop in European cities. Its novelty its artistic beauty and its 
conveniences for customers set it apart from even the most famous places of its kind, and 
PDNH LW RQHRI WKH VKRZSODFHVRI3DULV´103 It had ³ VTXDUHPHWUHVRI IORRU VSDFH´: an 
extravagant use of empty space was H[SUHVVHGWKURXJK³WKHbroad transverse space running 
across from the boulevard to the rue de la Paix, and two broad aisles extending to the 
EDFN´104 However, it was also a practical sales environment designed to engage the 
FXVWRPHU¶VDWWHQWLRQEHFDXVH³WKHPRVWVWULNLQJIHDWXUH RI7LIIDQ\¶VFHUWDLQO\WKHPRVWQRYHO
to Parisians, is the system of show-FDVHV´ +HUH JUHDWHU FXVWRPHU DFFHVV WR PHUFKDQGLVH
replaced WKH VHFOXGHG XSSHU VWRU\ VKRZURRP 7KDW LV ³LQVWHDG RI DUWLFOHV RI MHZHOU\ EHLQJ
brought out from safes and displayed one by one on a table before the prospective purchaser, 
all the articles for sale are exhibited in the familiar American way, in a series of glass and 
bronze show-FDVHV´ 7KHUH LV HQWLFHPHQW HQFRXUDJHPHQW WR HQJDJH ZLWK WKH PHUFKDQGLVH
without the immediate and potentially discouraging interaction with employees, because 
³YLVLWRUVPD\HQWHUWKHVWRUHZDQGHUIURPFDVHWRFDVHDWWKHLUOHLVXUH«RUPHUHO\HQMR\WKH
VSOHQGLGGLVSOD\´105 Here, the store is a tourist destination in its own right, a display case for 
the brand. 
7KLVLFRQLFVWRUHZDVWKHILUP¶VUHVSRQVHWR an expanding consumer market. For example, the 
SULFLQJV\VWHPDWWKH3ODFHGHO¶2SHUDVWRUHHQFRXUDJHGSXUFKDVHVDWPRGHVWVXPVDVZHOODV
H[WUDYDJDQW SULFHV ³DQ\ VXP IURP  WR IU´106 During the period under 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQWZRFKDQJHVRFFXUUHGLQWKHILUP¶VFXVWRPHUEDVH)LUVWWKHILUPEHFDPHOHVV
dependent on expatriate Americans. Secondly, a wider group of consumers was encouraged 
to patronize the international stores. Commentary on 7LIIDQ\¶VFXVWRPHUEDVHKDVHPSKDVL]HG
the expatriate American.107 There appears little question that American visitors were 
HQFRXUDJHG WR YLVLW WKH ILUP¶V (XURSHDQ RSHUDWLRQV 3DULV ZDV DQ LPSRUWDQW GHVWLQDWLRQ IRU
Americans visiting Europe in the years following the Civil War.108 Likewise, the London 
store sought to address the requirements of American customers. Advertisements from the 
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ODWH V SURYLGH ³GDWHV IRU GHOLYHULQJ &KULVWPDV 3UHVHQWV LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´109 
However, internal firm records show that by the 1910s English customers along with 
expatriate American customers were purchasing from the Regent Street store.110 In Paris, the 
QHZ  VWRUH RQ WKH 3ODFH GH O¶2SHUD ZDV ³QRW RQO\ IRU $PHULFDQV EXW IRU 3DULVLans 
WKHPVHOYHV´111 
Between 1850 and 1910, per capita GDP in France almost doubled.112 &KDQJHVWR7LIIDQ\¶V
operation in the Paris market reflect this increase in spending power. Initially retailing was an 
LQFLGHQWDORXWFRPHRI7LIIDQ\¶VEX\LQJRIILFHLQ3DULV and was a service provided for visiting 
Americans. By the 1910s, the firm had established an iconic retail store in a fashionable 
ORFDWLRQGHVLJQHGWRDSSHDOWRDQHZFRQVXPHUEDVH6LPLODUO\7LIIDQ\¶VFKDQJLQJRSHUDWLRQ
in London is a reflection of the move away from a restricted group of American customers 
travelling in Europe to an emerging indigenous market and widening consumer base. When 
Tiffany started buying in Europe in the 1840s, Paris was the most attractive market for the 
ILUP¶VPHUFKDQWDFWLYLWLHV:KHQWKHILUPRSHQHGLWV5HJHQW6WUHHWVWRUHLQ)UDQFH¶Vper 
capita *'3ZDVRQO\RIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V113 7LIIDQ\¶VDELOLW\WRGHYHORSLWVUHWDLO
format over this sixty-year period in two major European cities is indicative of a firm with the 
organizational capabilities to respond to changing consumer demand.  
 
Discussion 
 
This article addresses the following question: what firm level factors were required to initiate 
and sustain international retail operations in the late nineteenth centuU\" 7LIIDQ\¶V
international retail operation developed as the result of a combination of factors that came 
together at a relatively early date. They were a centralized organizational structure, a stable 
ownership structure, existing international engagement, a strong brand identity, and a relevant 
international retail format. In the context of an expanding consumer market, these factors 
facilitated the initiation and development of sustainable international retailing activity.  
Tiffany operated through a centralized organizational structure. The scale of the business was 
not large. The international business was a buying operation that developed a retail function. 
,QWLPHWKHUHWDLOIXQFWLRQEHFDPHGRPLQDQW7KHILUP¶VRUJDQL]DWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHSURYLGHGD
simple platform for the management of the retail operation. Had department stores tried to 
replicate their stores internationally, they would have been on a very different scale and 
required extensive integration with local distribution and supplier systems. In contrast, 
7LIIDQ\¶VRUJDQL]DWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHIDFLOLWDWHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRILQWHUQDWLRQDOVWRUHV 
Charles L. Tiffany and Gideon Reed provided continuity of leadership and strategic direction 
IRUDORQJDQGLPSRUWDQWSHULRGLQWKHILUP¶VGHYHORSPHQW,n particular, Gideon Reed had a 
crucial role in the establishment of the international operation. Within the ownership structure 
provided by partnership agreements, Reed established a branch office in Paris that laid the 
foundations for future European development. However, the partnership structure inevitably 
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led to shifting arrangements that could potentially destabilize the business. With 
incorporation, there was a fundamental change in the level of international engagement. The 
history of A.T. Stewart¶V department store is an example of what could happen to a business 
on the death of the key entrepreneurial innovator.114 Lacking direction and appropriate 
ownership arrangements, the business went into terminal decline. This is indicative of the 
instability associated with partnerships and unincorporated businesses. Partnerships remained 
a feature of large American department stores long after Tiffany incorporated. Incorporation 
balanced the value of strong individual leadership within the centralized organizational 
IUDPHZRUNRIWKHILUP,QFRUSRUDWLRQZDVFOHDUO\DQLPSRUWDQWIDFWRULQ7LIIDQ\¶VZLOOLQJQHVV
to engage with further international growth.   
)URP LWV HDUOLHVW \HDUV DV D UHWDLOHU LQ 1HZ <RUN LQWHUQDWLRQDO VRXUFLQJ GHILQHG 7LIIDQ\¶V
merchandise ranJH -RKQ % <RXQJ¶V UHJXODU EX\LQJ WULSV WR 3DULV LQ WKH V ZHUH
LQGLFDWLYH RI SDUWQHUV¶ FRPPLWPHQW WR WKLV DVSHFW RI WKH ILUP¶V FRPPHUFLDO LGHQWLW\ 7KLV
merchant activity drew the firm into international markets and gave it an increasing 
knowledge of them. The establishment of an international resident buying office proved 
IXQGDPHQWDOWR7LIIDQ\¶VUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHUHWDLOSRWHQWLDODYDLODEOHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPDUNHWV
With this, the retail business could grow incrementally. A buying office provided local 
knowledge and market understanding. The existence of the office facilitated the development 
of transaction-based assets. Tiffany was not the only American retail firm that engaged in 
international sourcing in the second half of the nineteenth century. The department store 
sector actively and extensively sourced in European markets. However, the size of 
department store organizations may have inhibited knowledge transfer across business 
functions as strategic decision-making became isolated from the knowledge accrued within 
WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V IXQFWLRQDO XQLWV ,Q FRQWUDVW DW 7LIIDQ\ EX\LQJ DQG UHWDLOLQJ ZHUH
centralized, so knowledge derived from one activity could easily transfer to another.  
From 1875, Tiffany had a consistent and clearly defined brand across its domestic and 
international markets. The firm took full advantage of this asset-based advantage. The ending 
of the partnership structure facilitated this, as did the development of retail formats suited to 
international markets. In this, Tiffany created a clear and consistent brand identity with 
regard to both the product and service environment. Exclusively selling products through its 
own retail outlets further enhanced this relationship.  In contrast, department stores did not 
have clear and consistent own brands. They had a fragmented brand architecture spread 
across a wide range of product qualities and categories. Woolworth, as representative of 
chain stores, had a recognizable fascia and identity. However, the firm did not have a strong 
product own brand that built on its retail identity. In contrast, Singer, as representative of a 
manufacturer with a retail network, had a distinct, strong brand consistent with the identity of 
its retail system. From a branding perspective, Tiffany resembled the manufacturing firm of 
Singer more than it resembled other retailers. The creation of a distinct brand was 
IXQGDPHQWDO WR 7LIIDQ\¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO GHYHORSPHQW ZKHWKHU IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI
American consumers wanting the security of buying from a familiar firm when travelling 
abroad or from the perspective of European consumers recognizing a desirable brand. As a 
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retailer, Tiffany was innovative by placing a distinctive brand and coherent brand message at 
the center of its marketing activities. 
For the process of retail internationalization in the late nineteenth century, scale could be an 
asset but scope was a liability. Trading name, fascia and brand proved fundamental to firm 
success. Woolworth and Singer used their organizational capabilities and scale to establish 
their dominant presence in host markets. However, neither firm built their international 
operations on the scope of their activities. Certainly, Woolworth sold merchandise in 
different categories but the firm did not do so to the same extent and on the same basis as the 
department stores. Likewise, Woolworth did not combine buying and selling functions in the 
VDPH ZD\ DV WKH GHSDUWPHQW VWRUHV 6LQJHU¶V GLVWULEXWLRQ V\VWHP HPSKDVL]HG D QDUURZ
product focus. Singer and Woolworth possessed a strong brand or company name and both 
developed a distribution system and retail format that facilitated replication. In contrast, the 
department stores were built on scale and scope but did not develop the same brand asset and 
a replicable retail format. Instead, they sold manufacturer brands and developed various 
captive brands. This was in contrast to Tiffany that did possess D GLVWLQFW EUDQG 7LIIDQ\¶V
organizational structure and merchandise range facilitated this. TKHILUP¶VGHYHORSPHQWRID
single brand strategy and the marketing of Tiffany goods exclusively through its own retail 
outlets domestically and internationally was a valuable commercial asset.  
  
Table 2 
 
7LIIDQ\¶VUHWDLODFWLYLWLHVLQ3DULVDQG/RQGRQXQGerwent considerable development between 
the arrival RIDUHVLGHQWSDUWQHULQ(XURSHLQDQGWKHRSHQLQJRIWKHILUP¶Viconic store 
format in Paris in 1910. In this, WKH ILUP¶V UHWDLO RSHUDWLRQV JUHZ ZLWK WKH RSSRUWXQLWLHV 
provided by the markets of London and Paris. The store development process indicates 
Tiffany went through three phases of international retail activity (see table 2). Initially retail 
activity was carried out through the international office which was established for buying 
activity. This was the merchant phase. This was followed by a period of proto-modern 
international retailing activity. In this phase, WKH ILUP¶V IDFLOLWLHV UHWDLQHGVRPHRI WKHROGHU
characteristics of the merchant operation with new customer facing activities: a buying office 
and discrete retail facilities designed to serve a narrow customer base. In this proto-modern 
phase, the firm transitioned from a merchant operation to a fully developed retail operation. 
This transition culminated in a modern retail offering as represented by the 1891 London 
store and the 1910 Paris store. Modern retail facilities provided street-level open access and 
an internal open display of merchandise. For Tiffany, these facilities provided a showcase for 
a distinct and consistent brand identity. In this combination, a consistent brand identity and 
PRGHUQ IDFLOLWLHV UHSUHVHQWHGDPDMRUGHYHORSPHQW LQ WKH ILUP¶V retail provision and was a 
clear acknowledgement of the changing needs of its widening customer base. This 
incremental development shows the firm acquired transaction-based assets during its time in 
international markets.  
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Conclusion 
 
The process of retail internationalization in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first 
century is explained in the management literature by firm drivers of change, internal 
facilitating competencies and the assertion of control over firm assets. However, this 
literature has not shown how this process occurs over an extended period within a changing 
market context. The research presented here addresses this gap in the literature by 
considering the firm level factors required to develop and sustain international retail 
operations during the late nineteenth century. 
7LIIDQ\¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ (XURSHDQ PDUNHWV LOOXVWUDWH WKH ILUP¶V use of asset-based advantages 
derived from the ILUP¶V brand, operating systems and formats. Initially, these were asset-
based advantages derived from innovation within the retail firm in the domestic market. 
These assets were developed in the domestic market and exploited in foreign markets to serve 
D FRQVXPHU JURXS IDPLOLDU ZLWK WKH ILUP¶V GRPHVWLF RSHUDWLRQV +RZHYHU 7LIIDQ\¶V 
development of transaction-based advantages derived from the experience of operating 
international outlets was to transform fundamentally WKH ILUP¶V DELOLW\ WR RSHUDWH LQ DQG
respond to international markets. 7LIIDQ\¶Vdevelopment of internal facilitating competencies 
enabled the firm to transfer asset-based ownership advantages and capture transaction-based 
ownership advantages. Functional coordination between buying and retailing activity 
facilitated the development RI WKH ODWWHU GXULQJ WKH ILUP¶V PHUFKDQW SKDVH )XQFWLRQDO
FRRUGLQDWLRQ DQG VWUDWHJLF GHFLVLRQ PDNHUV¶ NQRZOHGJH RI WKHVH IXQFWLRQV FRQWLQXHG WR
support international retail development throughout the period. The firm built on international 
management experience and this determined its ability to develop successful and sustainable 
international operations. The firm did not launch a retail store in the Paris market without first 
developing transaction-based ownership advantages. These informed subsequent expansion 
in London. This article contributes to the literature by showing how this process works over 
an extended period of more than sixty years, across two international markets.  
The management literature makes three implicit assumptions about international retail firms: 
they are primarily engaged in the retail trade in their domestic and foreign markets, they are 
large or very large corporations that are shareholder owned, and sourcing activity is not a 
distinguishing characteristic. This reflects international retailing activity at the end of the 
twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century. The business history literature 
has questioned the first assumption, that firms engaged in international retailing are primarily 
engaged in the retail trade in their domestic and foreign markets. In the business history 
literature, manufacturing firms are seen as drivers of retail internationalization before 1960. 
However, the findings reported here show that international retailing was associated with a 
retail firm from a very early date. The second assumption, that international retailing is the 
preserve of large or very large corporations that are shareholder owned, is qualified by the 
findings presented here. They show a centrally organized, specialist, smaller firm was well 
18 
 
placed to respond to international retail opportunities and it was better placed than larger 
contemporary firms of greater scale and scope. The findings also suggest the retail 
internationalization process is reliant on an appropriate ownership structure and that 
incorporation and internationalization occur during the same phase of development. The third 
assumption, that sourcing activity is not a distinguishing characteristic of international 
retailing, is challenged. In the management literature, international retailing has been 
conceptualized as a consumer facing activity and not a distribution channel process. 
However, as this study shows, sourcing can have a fundamental impact on the initiation of 
international retailing activity.    
The management literature indicates a mixture of exogenous and endogenous factors cause 
international retailing. That is, where international market opportunities motivate proactive 
retail firms to internationalize on the strength of their distinct retail brand and operating 
format. Tiffany was pulled into international markets through increasing consumer demand 
for its retail offering, and has the characteristics of a proactive retailer. However, unlike post-
1960 examples of retail internationalization, the firm did not arrive in those markets with a 
fully developed brand identity nor with a distinct operating format derived from operations in 
the domestic market. Therefore, this research qualifies previous understanding of the 
internationalization process and places an emphasis on transaction-based advantages derived 
from international activity rather than asset-based advantages derived from operations in the 
domestic market.  
In the United States, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the department store has 
defined the modernization of fixed store retailing. However, the department store did not 
become a vehicle for retail internationalization through the direct transfer of technology and 
concept. Indeed, even in the domestic market it proved difficult to replicate. The scope of the 
department store enterprise ultimately precluded replication. This study of Tiffany of New 
York shows that a smaller specialist retail organization was well suited to early 
internationalization. Brand identity, incremental international store development and 
awareness of changing consumer needs were important drivers of international retail activity 
at a very early date. Proactive retailers are able to expand internationally because of their 
brand relevance and distinctive retail format. The early history of Tiffany is a good example 
of this. This research shows it was not scale and scope that initiated early American 
international retailing, it was brand and focus. 
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Table 1. Tiffany Partnership Agreements 1837-67 
Date  Name of Partnership   Partners   Profit Share  
 
1837*  Tiffany & Young   Charles L. Tiffany Equal 
John B. Young  Equal 
 
1841, 1 May Tiffany, Young & Ellis  Charles L. Tiffany Equal   
      John B. Young  Equal 
Jabez Lewis Ellis  Equal 
 
1850, 15 April Tiffany, Young & Ellis (US) Charles L. Tiffany (TXDO 
  Tiffany, Reed & Co (Europe)  Gideon F.T. Reed (TXDO  
      John B. Young  Equal 
      Jabez Lewis Ellis  Equal  
 
1853, 1 May Tiffany & Co (US)  Charles L. Tiffany 3/8th    
  Tiffany, Reed & Co (Europe)  Gideon F.T. Reed 3/8th    
      Henry R. Treadwell 1/8th    
      William Branch  1/8th   
 
1856, 1 May Tiffany & Co (US)  Charles L. Tiffany 3/8th & 1/16th   
  Tiffany, Reed & Co (Europe)  Gideon F.T. Reed 3/8th & 1/16th  
      Henry R. Treadwell 1/8th   
 
1858, 1 May Tiffany & Co (US)  Charles L. Tiffany 3/8th  
  Tiffany, Reed & Co (Europe)  Gideon F.T. Reed 3/8th  
      Henry R. Treadwell 1/8th & 1/32nd  
George McClure  1/16th   
Alfred Bedford  1/32nd ۆ   
 
1861, 1 May Tiffany & Co (US)  Charles L. Tiffany 3/8th   
  Tiffany, Reed & Co (Europe)  Gideon F.T. Reed 3/8th   
      Henry R. Treadwell 1/8th & 1/32nd  
      George McClure  1/16th   
      Alfred Bedford  1/32nd ۆ  
 
1864, 1 May Tiffany & Co (US)  Charles L. Tiffany 3/8th   
  Tiffany, Reed & Co (Europe)  Gideon F.T. Reed 3/8th  
Alfred Bedford  1/8th  
George McClure  1/16th  
      Charles T. Cook  1/16th 
 
1867, 1 May Tiffany & Co (US)  Charles L. Tiffany 3/8th & 1/32nd  
  Tiffany, Reed & Co (Europe)  Gideon F.T. Reed 3/8th & 1/32nd  
      Charles T. Cook  1/8th  
      George McClure  1/32nd ± 
      John Lockwood  1/32nd ±  
 
LQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJDJUHHPHQWGHULYHGIURPDJUHHPHQWSOXV6DODU\RISDۆDs $2,000pa 
in lieu, ± $10,000pa guaranteed 
Source: Tiffany Archive, Co-partnership Agreements, Legal Department, Partnership Agreements, 1841-1867. 
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Table 2. Evolution RI7LIIDQ\¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDOOperation: 1837-1914 
Stage Paris    London   Operational Functions   Notes 
Merchant Activity 
Ia Address(es) unknown: 1840s  Langham Hotel: 1871  Buying activities     Distinguishing selling point in  
               domestic market 
Ib 79 rue de Richelieu: 1850-68  29 Argyll Street: 1871/2-82  Primary: Resident buying office    Resident partner in Europe: 1850 
     5 Argyll Place: 1883-91  Secondary: Ad hoc retailing 
Proto-Modern International Retailing Activity 
IIa 57 rue du Cardinal Fesch/  Not applicable   Equal: Salesroom retailing    Incorporation: 1868 
de Châteaudun*: 1868-78      Equal: Resident buying office   Adoption of international brand: 1875 
IIb ELV$YHQXHGHO¶2SHUD  Not applicable   Primary: Salesroom retailing    Brand recognition at the  
 1878-1910       Secondary: Resident buying office   Paris Exhibition of 1878 
Modern International Retailing Activity 
IIIa Not applicable   221/221A Regent Street:  Primary: Ground floor, open access retailing  Emergence of an indigenous 
     1891-1914   Secondary: Resident buying office   clientele at international locations 
IIIb 3ODFHGHO¶2SHUD-14  Not applicable   Primary: Iconic store concept    Creation of an international 
         Secondary: Resident buying office   retail-brand concept 
Note: *After the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 the rue du Cardinal Fesch was renamed rue de Châteaudun. 
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